Race and Democracy: Prologue by Lieske, Joel A
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science Department
6-1999
Race and Democracy: Prologue
Joel A. Lieske
Cleveland State University, j.lieske@csuohio.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clpolsci_facpub
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Publisher's Statement
Copyright 1999 Cambridge University Press. Available on publisher's site at http://www.jstor.org/
stable/420552.
Repository Citation
Lieske, Joel A., "Race and Democracy: Prologue" (1999). Political Science Faculty Publications. 2.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clpolsci_facpub/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Original Citation
Lieske, Joel. 1999. "Race and Democracy: Prologue." PS: Political Science and Politics 32:217-224.
Race and Democracy 
Prologue 
s every school child knows, Amer- 
ica, if nothing else, is a nation of 
mmigrants drawn from diverse 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. What many 
adult Americans also consciously perceive, 
but seldom admit, is our collective dis- 
comfort in addressing the issue of race 
and race relations honestly and forth- 
rightly. 
Fortunately, this was not the path fol- 
lowed by what many might consider to be 
an "illiberal" Tocqueville (Banfield 1991). 
And it would be a mistake to dismiss his 
analysis of the American race dilemma as 
too "raw," too "pessimistic," or perhaps 
"antiquated" and even "offensive" by 
present-day standards, although nine- 
teenth-century word usage and a formal 
literary style may encourage this misper- 
ception. Rather, we need to understand 
what he had to say, if for no other reason 
than doing so opens a window to the past 
and provides a benchmark to measure 
how far we have come. 
As a cultural historian 
and political philoso- 
by pher, Tocqueville knew 
Joel Lieske, that to comprehend the 
Cleveland State Universiy development and evolu- tion of American federal 
democracy he first had 
to understand the origins and characteris- 
tic features of our political culture and 
how and why it changed. Clearly, the 
dominant racial views held by Americans 
during the early nineteenth century are 
not those held by most Americans today. 
But neither is there any guarantee that 
our more liberal and enlightened views 
will hold sway during the next millennium 
in the face of the tensions and conflicts 
generated by cultural diversity and the 
reduction of whites to a racial minority. 
Nor is there any certainty that the experi- 
ment in democracy will survive our un- 
precedented experiment in nation build- 
ing. 
In 1965, a liberal Democratic Congress 
enacted amendments to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act that ended "racist" 
national quotas and introduced the family- 
reunification principle. Along with special 
congressional amnesties and group prefer- 
ences, as well as differential fertility rates 
among the races, these amendments have 
produced dramatic increases in immigra- 
tion and permanently altered the current 
and future racial-ethnic composition of 
the United States. In 1960, the United 
States was 88.6% white, 10.5% black, and 
less than 1% Asian and other. Today, 
whites constitute less than 74% of the 
population, while blacks, Hispanics, and 
Asians comprise another 13%, 9%, and 
4%, respectively (Lieske 1998). 
Currently, some 830,000 legal, and an 
estimated 300,000 illegal, immigrants en- 
ter the country each year, most from 
Third World countries. This is more than 
are admitted into all of the other coun- 
tries of the world combined (James 1995). 
As a result, the Bureau of the Census esti- 
mates that the percentage of whites will 
drop to 64 by 2020 and to less than 50 by 
2050. But so far, the Bureau's forecasts 
have not been able to keep up with 
changes in the pace of immigration and 
the country's racial-ethnic makeup. This is 
another reason why Tocqueville's analysis 
of the American race dilemma takes on 
new meaning and relevance today. 
Surely the changes we are witnessing in 
American society at the turn of the twenty- 
first century are at least as momentous, if 
not more so, than those Tocqueville ob- 
served during his visit (Beck 1994; Caplan 
1998; Fallows 1983). If current immigra- 
tion policies and trends persist, whites will 
become a racial minority sometime during 
the next century. And the U.S. will have 
become, if it is not already, the most ra- 
cially and ethnically diverse country on 
the face of the globe (Murdoch 1995; 
White 1982). 
In this article, I first examine some of 
Tocqueville's concerns about the Ameri- 
can democratic experiment. Then I discuss 
why he regarded the American race di- 
lemma as the central stumbling block to 
the success of this experiment, a view that 
reflected the fears of many white Ameri- 
cans of his day over the threats posed by a 
sizeable slave population as well as a hos- 
tile and indigenous Native-American pop- 
ulation. I then explore the lessons in race 
relations that may be drawn from the "ex- 
pulsion" of the Indians, Henry Reeve's 
euphemism for their forced deportation, 
which unfortunately does not reflect either 
the reality-"ethnic cleansing"-or ef- 
fects-"genocidal"-of their removal. 
Next, I examine why Tocqueville thought 
the principle of modern slavery tended to 
enslave not only the Africans but also 
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their southern white masters, thereby confronting the 
new republic with a blatant repudiation of its democratic 
ideals and an intractable race dilemma. Finally, I discuss 
the recent changes in race relations, both positive and 
negative, that may bear on the future of American 
democracy. 
The Doubting Tocqueville 
It could be argued that Tocqueville came to America 
skeptical of democracy and returned to France as a be- 
liever, if not in its possibilities for human progress, at 
least in its inevitability. But like the struggles to keep his 
Christian (Catholic) faith, which began at the tender age 
of 15 when he stumbled across the works of the French 
philosophers while browsing through his father's library 
(Pierson 1959, 8), Tocqueville seems to have been 
plagued throughout his life and the ten years it took him 
to write Democracy in America with serious misgivings 
and doubts. 
What made democracy possible in America? Were the 
causes largely accidental and providential? More specifi- 
cally, was America's success due to the absence of hos- 
tile neighbors and disorderly metropolises? Good early 
settlers (at least in the case of the Puritans)? An empty 
and boundless continent? The restlessness of Anglo- 
Americans, their commercial spirit, and their insatiable 
quest for material prosperity? Or was it due to the laws 
and political institutions of the Anglo-Americans? Or 
alternatively, was it because of their mores, habits, and 
customs, in short, what today would be called their cul- 
ture? Even as Tocqueville ([1835] 1945, I: 319) sorted 
out the relative importance of these factors-the laws 
over physical circumstances and culture over all-he was 
unsure what tied Americans to each other. 
In Knickerbocker New York, his initial impressions of 
America were anything but favorable. Perhaps overly 
quick to judge, the young French aristocrat found the 
ries, no national roots. What, then, can be the only tie 
which unites the different parts of this vast body? 
L'interet?" (Pierson 1959, 73). 
But later, in developing the major themes and ideas of 
Democracy, during what Schleifer (1980) calls his "sec- 
ond journey," Tocqueville ([1840] 1945, II: 318) alerts 
readers to the larger and perhaps more serious dangers 
he saw for the new democratic republic: an excess of ma- 
terialism, rampant individualism, the threat of a tyranni- 
cal majority, political corruption, and, last but not least, 
a paternalistic state despotism that would be imple- 
mented by the "guardians" of democracy in the name of 
equality. 
The American Race Dilemma 
What appeared to Tocqueville to constitute the great- 
est threat to the new republic, however, was the pres- 
ence of a large black (slave) population and the failure 
of the three races-white, black, and red-that then in- 
habited the United States to assimilate.1 But the exclu- 
sion of blacks and Indians from American life was not 
the only threat that concerned him. He was also troubled 
by the profound cultural differences that separated the 
races and the instances of racial genocide (bloody slave 
rebellions) that perhaps foreshadowed events yet to 
come. 
Perhaps because he was European, Tocqueville saw 
the white "man" as superior, because of his civilization, 
"in intelligence, in power, and in enjoyment." Well below 
him were the "Negro" and the "Indian," two "unhappy" 
races that he believed had "nothing in common, neither 
birth, nor features, nor language, nor habits." And, given 
the profound technological and social differences that 
separated the races, Tocqueville thought that the "supe- 
rior" position of the European was similar to the domi- 
nant position of "man" (the human race) over the lower 
animals. "He makes them subservient to his use, when 
he cannot subdue he destroys 
What appeared to Tocqueville to constitute the great- 
est threat to the new republic, however, was the pres- 
ence of a large black (slave) population and the failure 
of the three races-white, black, and red-that then 
inhabited the United States to assimilate. 
residents "stinking with national conceit," materialistic, 
and disappointingly middle class. But he thought he un- 
derstood what held the developing ethnic polyglot to- 
gether. The only possible answer, he concluded, was self- 
interest, which he later expanded into "mutual self- 
interest" or "self-interest properly understood." In his 
diary, he wrote: "American Society is composed of a 
thousand different elements newly brought together. The 
men who live under the laws are still English, French, 
German, Dutch. They have neither religion, nor morals, 
nor ideas in common. Up to the present it can't be said 
that the Americans have a national character, unless it's 
that of having none. Here there are no common memo- 
them" (1945, I: 332). 
In Tocqueville's view, both the 
black and Indian races were 
sorely oppressed. But he believed 
the subhuman state of blacks 
made them particularly vulnera- 
ble. In one stroke, he wrote, the 
bondage of slavery had "deprived 
the descendants of the Africans 
of almost all the privileges of humanity." The "Negro" 
had lost all memories of his country, language, religion, 
and customs without "acquiring any claim to European 
privileges," and therefore found himself isolated in a no 
man's land "between two races, sold by the one, repulsed 
by the other" (332). The condition of many blacks ap- 
peared to be so wretched that Tocqueville doubted 
whether they could ever take care of themselves. Servi- 
tude, he thought, might brutalize them, but liberty would 
surely destroy them. 
The oppression of the Indians, in Tocqueville's judg- 
ment, was no less fatal. But he felt the effects were dif- 
ferent because, like many of his contemporaries, he held 
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a condescending view of them. Indians were "savages," 
who "lived quietly in their woods, enduring the vicissi- 
tudes and practicing the virtues and vices common to 
savage nations." By dispersing and driving them into the 
Great American Desert, European settlers had marginal- 
ized them and "condemned them to a wandering life, 
full of inexpressible sufferings" (333). 
Moreover, he believed, the Indians' misery was only 
compounded by their rejection of European civilization. 
Before the discovery of America, their behavior had 
been held in check "only" by their culture. 
When European settlers took their land and 
destroyed their way of life, "their wants in- ATHE 
creased above measure" and "European /LE 
tyranny rendered them more disorderly and EXPLORII 
less civilized than they were before" (333-34). 
And, as the Indians' moral and physical con- ee steamei dition grew progressively worse, "they became onboarc 
more barbarous as they became more Texas, 
wretched." For this reason, Europeans were The Ind 
unable "to change the character of the Indi- 
ans"; and, though they had the power to de- 
stroy, they were not able "to subdue and civi- 
lize them." 
In comparing the plight of the Negro and the Indian, 
Tocqueville found both paradox and irony. The black 
man, he thought, had been placed at "the extreme limit 
of servitude," while the Indian had always resided at 
"the uttermost verge of liberty." Thus the "Negro makes 
a thousand fruitless efforts to insinuate himself among 
men who repulse him; he conforms to the tastes of his 
oppressors, adopts their opinions, and hopes by imitating 
them to form a part of their community. Having been 
told from infancy that his race is naturally inferior to 
that of the whites, he assents to the proposition and is 
ashamed of his own nature" (334). By contrast, the In- 
dian "has his imagination inflated with the pretended 
nobility of his origin, and lives and dies in the midst of 
these dreams of pride. Far from desiring to conform his 
habits to ours, he loves his savage life as the distinguish- 
ing mark of his race and repels every advance to civiliza- 
tion, less, perhaps, from hatred of it than from a dread 
of resembling the Europeans" (334). 
As a result, Tocqueville concluded, "the Negro, who 
earnestly desires to mingle his race with that of the Eu- 
ropean, cannot do so, while the Indian, who might suc- 
ceed to a certain extent, disdains to make the attempt. 
The servility of the one dooms him to slavery, the pride 
of the other to death" (355). 
The Expulsion of the Indians 
The systematic removal of Indians from their tribal 
lands constitutes one of the darker chapters in American 
history. But it contains a number of harsh, yet universal 
and timeless, lessons-for example, the struggle for ra- 
cial dominance, the resettlement of contested land by 
the dominant race, the territorial basis of racial survival, 
the ubiquitous risks of minority racial status, and the vul- 
nerability of civil liberties and rights in a multiracial soci- 
ety-that may apply with equal force to the plight of 
contemporary ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds in 
Iraq and the Palestinians in Israel. 
The story begins with the destruction of the Indian 
habitat. At first, Tocqueville noted, a few scattered Euro- 
pean settlers would drive away the wild game, thereby 
depriving Indians of their livelihood. This process, he 
argued, had the same effect as sterilizing agricultural 
fields. But strictly speaking, it was not the Europeans 
who drove the Indians away. Rather, "It is famine, a 
happy distinction which had escaped the casuists of 
former 
times 
TOUR and for 
KXS DE OCQIEVILLE which we 
NG DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA are in- 
debted to ber 25, 1831: Tocqueville and Beaumont board a modern 
r in Memphis bound for New Orleans. Also 
i are Sam Houston, soon to be president of s 
and 50 Choctaw Indians under federal guard. ery! 
ians were being forcibly relocated to Arkansas. (339). 
By the 
time of 
Tocque- 
ville's visit, however, the expulsion of the Indians had 
become a regular, legal, and institutionalized process. 
Whenever European settlers began to encroach on tribal 
land, he observed, the federal government would send 
envoys to negotiate a new land grab. After assembling 
the Indians, and then eating and drinking with them, the 
envoys would patronize them, questioning whether the 
land they inhabited was any better than the lands 
abounding in game and solitude to the West. After that, 
the officials would proffer the carrot of European civili- 
zation: "firearms, woolen garments, kegs of brandy, glass 
necklaces, bracelets of tinsel, ear-rings, and looking- 
glasses." If the Indians balked, they would brandish the 
stick. Consent was required, they emphasized, and if it 
was not forthcoming, there were no guarantees that the 
federal government would be able to protect Indian 
rights. In this manner, Tocqueville noted, the Americans 
were able to obtain "at a very low price, whole prov- 
inces, which the richest sovereigns of Europe could not 
purchase" (341). 
To his credit, Tocqueville deplored the "great evils" of 
this expulsion, but saw them as "irremediable." The In- 
dian nations of North America were "doomed to perish," 
he predicted, because they were afforded "only the alter- 
native of war or civilization"; they could "either destroy 
the Europeans or become their equals." But he felt the 
Indians were incapable of civilizing themselves in time. 
"Civilization," he argued, "is the result of a long social 
process, which takes place in the same spot and is 
handed down from one generation to another, each one 
profiting by the experience of the last." Moreover, the 
first step toward civilization, he thought, was to "culti- 
vate the soil" and tie people to the land. The Indians, he 
believed, would never pass through this agricultural stage 
because they viewed "labor not merely as an evil, but as 
a disgrace." And so he saw their pride contending 
against civilization "as obstinately as their indolence" 
(342-43). 
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European dominance over the Indians, therefore, was ual extinction of the northern tribes, the petition ques- 
due not to differences in native intelligence but to supe- tions whether the Cherokee "remnants" will suffer the 
rior civilization. He was convinced that Indians had "as same fate. It then lays out, in language that is clearly 
much natural genius as the peoples of Europe in their intended to appeal to Christian morality and evoke the 
greatest undertakings; but nations as well as men require God-given "unalienable rights" claimed by the Founders 
time to learn, whatever may be their intelligence and in the Declaration of Independence, the Indians' 
their zeal" (347). Unfortunately, ancient history sug- (aboriginal) claim to their tribal land as "an inheritance 
gested to him that barbarous nations become civilized from our fathers, who possessed it from time immemo- 
only when they conquer more advanced civilizations, as rial, as a gift from our common Father in heaven" (353- 
in the Mongol conquest of China. Even recent history 54; emphasis added). 
seemed to confirm the "destructive influence" of highly Finally it asks what justification the state of Georgia or 
civilized nations upon less civilized ones.2 Unfortunately, the United States could have for seizing Cherokee land. 
the historical lesson that seemed most relevant to the If the land was being taken as reparation for the Chero- 
American experience was not encouraging (347): "when kee's support of Britain during the American Revolu- 
the side on which the physical force lies also possesses tion, then why was a "land for peace" clause not inserted 
an intellectual superiority, the conquered party seldom into the first peace treaty after the war? In a scathing 
becomes civilized; it retreats or is destroyed." denunciation, Tocqueville concludes that the expulsion 
Tocqueville believed that Pres- 
ident George Washington had 
articulated an enlightened policy Tocqueville believed that the effects of slavery were as of magnanimity toward the Indi-s f w a t 
ans. In an address to Congress, detrimental and pernicious for whites as they were 
Washington had emphasized injurious and debasing to blacks. In support of this that, since they were "more en- 
lightened and powerful than the contention, he cited the American experience with 
Indian nations," Americans were slavery and noted how colonies and provinces compar- "bound in honor to treat them 
with kindness, and even with atively free of slaves grew and prospered more rapidly 
genersity." But, as Tocquevile than those containing large slave populations. recorded, this "virtuous and 
high-minded policy" was never 
followed. Sadly, "the rapacity of the settlers [was] usually 
backed by the tyranny of the government" (350). More- 
over, he felt that southern state legislatures had pur- 
posely sought the expulsion of the India overnment itself 
had allowed "a few savage tribes" to perish in order to 
preserve the Union. 
The federal government may have tried to mitigate the 
plight of other tribes by transporting them into remote 
regions at public cost, but Tocqueville understood why 
the Indians were reluctant to settle out West. Foremost, 
they justifiably feared that the domestic habits they had 
acquired would be "irrevocably lost" in the wilderness. 
Second, they had neither the "energy of barbarians" nor 
the "resources of civilization" to subdue the hostile 
tribes which would oppose their entry. Finally, they real- 
ized that their next home would also only be temporary 
because of state laws hostile to Indians, the inability of 
the federal government to secure the promised sanctu- 
ary, and the "hollow" promises of the white man. "Thus 
the tyranny of the states," Tocqueville concluded, 
"obliges the savages to retire; the Union, by its promises 
and resources, facilitates their retreat; and these mea- 
sures tend to precisely the same end" (353). 
In his closing arguments, Tocqueville appended a mov- 
ing quote from a 1829 Cherokee petition to Congress 
affirming the tribe's unwillingness to give up lands they 
believed were bequeathed to them by their forefathers. 
"By the will of our Father in heaven," the petition begins, 
"the red man of America has become small, and the 
white man great and renowned." After noting the grad- 
of the Indians was accomplished in the very name of mo- 
rality (355; emphasis added): 
The Spanish were unable to exterminate the Indian race 
by those unparalleled atrocities [hunted them down with 
bloodhounds] which brand them with indelible shame, 
nor did they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its 
rights; but the Americans of the United States have ac- 
complished this twofold purpose with singular felicity, 
tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding 
blood, and without violating a single great principle of 
morality in the eyes of the world. It is impossible to de- 
stroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity. 
The Enslavement of the Blacks 
The expulsion of the Indians was clearly a shameful 
repudiation of the new republic's humanitarian ideals. 
But it was the peculiar institution of slavery, peculiar in 
the sense that it went against everything America stood 
for, that Tocqueville thought constituted the greatest 
physical threat to whites and the ultimate survival of the 
republic itself. In his view, slavery posed a race dilemma 
that came in three interrelated parts: the presence of a 
large black population on American soil, the segregated 
condition of the white and black races, and the racial 
prejudices of white Americans. 
In his section on the "Situation of the Black Popula- 
tion in the United States, and Dangers with which Its 
Presence Threatens the Whites," Tocqueville distin- 
guished three types of white racial prejudice: the "preju- 
dice of the master," the "prejudice of race," and the 
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"prejudice of color." He also raised the disturbing possi- 
bility that racial prejudice in America, at least at the 
time of his visit, may not have been wholly irrational and 
without justification. 
Contrary to contemporary liberal views, Tocqueville 
thought the race dilemma was largely intractable. "Those 
who hope that the Europeans will ever be amalgamated 
with the Negroes appear to me to delude themselves," 
he cautioned (359). In the next breath, however, he ad- 
mitted that this conclusion was not based on reason or 
factual evidence. Rather, it rested on his pessimistic 
reading of history: "Hitherto wherever the whites have 
been the most powerful, they have held the blacks in 
degradation or in slavery; wherever the Negroes have 
been strongest, they have destroyed the whites; this has 
been the only balance that has ever taken place between 
the two races." 
Tocqueville apparently staked his claim on the stigma 
whites attached to interracial marriage. "It is true," he 
conceded, "that in the North of the Union marriages 
may be legally contracted between Negroes and whites; 
but public opinion would stigmatize as infamous a man 
who should connect himself with a Negress, and it would 
be difficult to cite a single instance of such a union" 
(359).3 
Moreover, he believed that the effects of slavery were 
as detrimental and pernicious for whites as they were 
injurious and debasing to blacks. In support of this con- 
tention, he cited the American experience with slavery 
and noted how colonies and provinces comparatively free 
of slaves grew and prospered more rapidly than those 
containing large slave populations. The same generaliza- 
tion appeared to hold true in the West. Ohio was more 
populated and prosperous than Kentucky, he thought, 
because it was free and because slavery dishonored labor 
and degraded the human condition. 
Slavery was less productive, he believed, because it 
provided fewer incentives to work and because the ex- 
pense of maintaining slaves was constant, extending to 
the very young and the elderly who could do no work. 
Slavery, he thought, also influenced attitudes and tastes 
for work and pleasure in a profoundly negative way. To 
illustrate his point, he contrasted the "white inhabitant 
of Ohio," who was compelled to "subsist by his own ex- 
A slaveship enters port. Photo courtesy of Smithsonian Institute 
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ertions" and regarded "temporal prosperity as the chief 
aim of his existence," with "the Kentuckian," who lived 
in "idle independence" and scorned not only labor itself 
"but all the undertakings that labor promotes." "Thus 
slavery," Tocqueville concluded, "prevents the whites not 
only from becoming opulent, but even from desiring to 
become so" (I: 364). Finally, Tocqueville attributed the 
greater economic development he found in the 
North-in shipping, manufactures, railroads, and ca- 
nals-to state prohibitions against slavery. 
At the same time, he felt the "situation" of emanci- 
pated Negroes in the North was similar to that of the 
Indians. He thought they remained "half civilized and 
deprived of their rights in the midst of a population that 
[was] far superior to them in wealth and knowledge," 
thereby exposing them "to the tyranny of the laws and 
the intolerance of the people" (367-68). On some ac- 
counts, he felt they were even worse off because they 
were haunted by the memories of slavery and could not 
own land. Many, he could see, were faring "miserably," 
and those who were able to congregate in the "great 
towns" were eking out "a wretched and precarious exis- 
tence" by doing "the meanest" of jobs. 
Another negative feature of American slavery for 
Tocqueville was its division of the country into two dis- 
tinctive cultural regions, North and South. The white 
population was growing much faster than the black pop- 
ulation in the North, he observed, because of natural 
increase, immigration from Europe, and, most of all, the 
prohibition against slaves. This prohibition, he believed, 
had the unintended consequence of fostering a bifur- 
cated migration: blacks to the South and whites to the 
North. 
Because slavery was already established in the South, 
Tocqueville could see a host of reasons why it would be 
difficult to abolish. For one, Europeans were not well- 
suited to live and work in the southern tropics. For an- 
other, 
southern 
agricul- 
ture, es- THE TOUR 
pecially ALEXIS DE I OCQIEVILLE 
the pro- EXPLORING DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
duction March 2, 1839: Tocqueville is elected to represer 
of to- Valognes in France's Chamber of Deputies. He se bacco, the national government in several posts until 18 
cotton, including a stint as Foreign Minister (1849), advc 
and civic engagement (short of revolt), prison reform, 
sugar abolition of slavery. 
cane, 
required 
more day-to-day care in the blazing sun than grain-based 
northern agriculture. Third, southern states that abol- 
ished slavery would put themselves at a competitive dis- 
advantage with those that did not. Fourth, blacks would 
likely rebel if emancipation were introduced gradually to 
the children of slaves, as in some northern states. Fi- 
nally, whites would not be able to rid themselves of a 
freed black population and would therefore feel threat- 
ened whenever they were confronted with equal or supe- 
rior numbers of blacks. Even worse, once blacks were 
emancipated, they would justifiably demand land, educa- 
tion, and the (constitutional) right to keep and bear arms. 
Given Tocqueville's analysis of the race problem-the 
difficulties of abolishing slavery in the South, the realities 
of white race prejudice, the segregated condition of the 
white and black races, and the profound cultural differ- 
ences that separated them-his pessimism about a multi- 
racial future becomes at least understandable. He could 
only conceive of two paths: total separatism or total inte- 
gration. "The negroes and the whites must either wholly 
part or wholly mingle," he warned (373). There was no 
middle ground. Yet, given the stigma attached to racial 
intermarriage, he could not entertain assimilation. 
To buttress his position, he appealed to authority, spe- 
cifically Thomas Jefferson's well-known, but now intellec- 
tually branded (O'Brien 1996), remark about the possi- 
bility of racial integration (Tocqueville 1945, I: 373): 
Nothing is more clearly written in the book of destiny 
than the emancipation of the blacks; and it is equally cer- 
tain, that the two races will never live in a state of equal 
freedom under the same government, so insurmountable 
are the barriers which nature, habit, and opinion have 
established between them. 
Tocqueville then stated his own belief that the white 
and black races would never live in any country on an 
equal footing, and that achieving equality would be more 
difficult in the United States than elsewhere. A despot 
might be able to "succeed in commingling" the races, he 
predicted, but, as long as the country remains demo- 
cratic, "no one will undertake so difficult a task; and it 
may be foreseen that the freer the white population of 
the United States becomes, the more isolated will it re- 
main" (371). 
Racial isolation and separatism, Tocqueville thought, 
derived from the human (universal) tendency to take 
pride in one's own racial origins-an idea that is basic to 
many contemporary theories of "ethnic identification" 
and "ethnic nepotism"-which he felt was natural to the 
English, but was augmented in the United 
States (Vanhanen 1991). "The white citizen of 
the United States is proud of his race and 
proud of himself' (Tocqueville 1945, I: 375). 
This pride of racial origin, he inferred, would 
lead to several predictable consequences. 
It One was that it would "always keep" south- 
erved in ern whites aloof from the black race because 
51, of their fear of being assimilated to the "Ne- )cating groes," their former slaves, and because of and their dread of sinking below other whites, 
their neighbors. Another was that the aboli- 
tion of slavery in the South would only in- 
crease "the repugnance of the white popula- 
tion for blacks." Tocqueville based this prediction on 
how whites avoided blacks in the North when legal barri- 
ers to integration were dropped. A final consequence, he 
thought, was that whites' failure to "intermingle" would 
ultimately lead to race war (375). 
Southern whites, in Tocqueville's view, were therefore 
confronted with three stark choices: (1) they could free 
the blacks and "intermingle" (i.e., intermarry) with them; 
(2) they could keep them in slavery as long as possible; 
or (3) they could adopt "intermediate measures" that 
would likely and quickly terminate "in the most horrible 
of civil [i.e., race] wars and perhaps in the extirpation of 
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one or the other of the two races" (379). Thus, Tocque- 
ville believed that southern planters were reluctant to 
abolish slavery, not so much for economic reasons, but 
because of their conviction that it "would imperil their 
own existence." 
Tocqueville also believed that southern whites would 
never accept assimilation because of their "racial pride." 
At the same time, they would never abolish slavery be- 
cause of their fear of becoming a racial minority, and 
that was why they would continue to deny blacks the ed- 
ucation they needed to become free and independent. 
But, by sinking blacks to the level of "brutes," Tocque- 
ville observed, southerners had unwittingly debased 
themselves as well, especially the planters who lived in 
"illicit intercourse" with black women and consigned 
their progeny to the brutal marketplace of slavery. 
Thus, the principle of modern slavery, Tocqueville 
concluded, had bequeathed southern whites with evil, 
but foreseeable, consequences and an inescapable di- 
lemma (380-81): 
When the Europeans chose their slaves from a race dif- 
fering from their own, which many of them considered as 
inferior to the other races of mankind, and any notion of 
intimate union with which they all repelled with horror, 
they must have believed that slavery would last forever, 
since there is no intermediate state that can be durable 
between the excessive inequality produced by servitude 
and the complete equality that originates in indepen- 
dence. 
Epilogue 
When Tocqueville visited America, the moral revul- 
sion against slavery, which first surfaced in Great Britain 
among evangelical Christians during the late eighteenth 
century, had already spread to New England and other 
northern states. What he could not foresee was the 
emergence of an anti-slavery crusade that would first le- 
gally ban the international slave trade, then end slavery 
in the United States and the British Empire, and ulti- 
mately succeed in abolishing it throughout the civilized 
world (Sowell 1994, 210). As a member of the French 
Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville himself helped draft 
and push through legislation that abolished slavery in all 
of the French colonies. Thus, where Christian morality 
failed to save the Indians, it ultimately helped to liberate 
the Africans. 
Although Tocqueville could envision a race war and 
the breakup of the Union, he could not foresee the 
bloody and costly Civil War, fought mostly by whites 
over the slavery issue. Neither could he foresee, although 
it would not have surprised him, a new system of racial 
subjugation in the South that would negate the civil 
rights amendments passed after the war and last until 
the middle of the twentieth century. 
However, many other changes in race relations, mostly 
positive, fall within the purview of Tocqueville's analysis 
and his predictions that American democracy would 
move, steadily and inexorably, toward greater political 
and social equality. One, of course, is a dramatic change 
since the 1940s in the racial attitudes among white 
Americans, who have become much more tolerant and 
sensitive to racial and social injustice. A second is the 
passage during the 1950s and 1960s of civil rights legisla- 
tion that struck down longtime barriers to racial equality. 
A third is the greater political representation of blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asian Americans in national, state, and 
urban government. A fourth is a much greater sensitivity 
on the part of state and federal governments to the 
plight of a surviving "remnant" of some one-and-one- 
half to two million Indians who still live, for the most 
part, on isolated reservations in the western states. To 
date, some relief has been granted in the form of special 
state and federal economic development and job-training 
programs, the recognition of aboriginal fishing rights, 
and the legalization of gambling casinos on Indian-held 
land. Finally, there has been a greater acceptance of in- 
terracial marriage. Data collected by the U.S. Census 
Bureau in 1995 show that 27.1% of all Hispanics, 9.8% 
of all blacks, and 2.7% of all whites marry outside their 
"race" or ethnicity (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998, 60). 
On the negative side, American cities and metropoli- 
tan areas are as segregated today as they were during 
the 1960s (Gillmor and Doig 1992). Racial discrimina- 
tion and ethnic nepotism have not gone away. And de- 
mographers have detected a new racial-ethnic separatism 
that is reflected in the development of new and distinc- 
tive regional subcultures, which have overlaid, consoli- 
dated, and sometimes swamped earlier waves of racial 
and ethnic settlement (Elazar 1994; Lieske 1993). Fi- 
nally, in the wake of the new immigrant waves, some 
observers are beginning to express fears that America 
may be "losing itself" by virtue of a loss of self-govern- 
ment, an erosion of community, a diminishing of the 
American Dream, a decline in the overall quality of life, 
and a loss of national cohesion and political stability-as 
it continues to grow, shed its skin, and become more and 
more culturally diverse (Caplan 1998; Sandel 1996; 
White 1982). 
Perhaps the major unknown in the race equation is 
the "new immigrants." Will they assimilate into Ameri- 
can society, or will they form separate and distinctive 
ethnic enclaves (Caplan 1998; Fallows 1983)? Will they 
fulfill the civic obligations of American citizenship, such 
as voting and community service, or will they become 
free-riders so they can better pursue the American 
Dream for themselves and their families (White 1982)?4 
Finally, will they accept core democratic values, support 
America's pluralistic institutions, and blend into our two- 
party system, or will they form new partisan coalitions 
with other minorities to achieve racial and cultural domi- 
nance when they become a political majority by the mid- 
dle of the next century (James 1995)? 
The American experiment in democracy has succeeded 
in the minds of many political scientists (Wilson and Di- 
Iulio 1998, 34) because the Founders "insisted on taking 
human nature pretty much as it was" and then adopted a 
system of checks and balances, primarily through the 
separation of powers and federalism, that has worked, 
not in spite of human imperfections, "but because of 
them." But it remains to be seen whether we can forge a 
new democratic "nation" that truly lives up to our na- 
tional motto: E Pluribus Unum, "from many, one." 
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Notes 
1. As Tocqueville warned in his poignant 104-page chapter on race 
relations, the longest by far in his two-volume treatise on American 
democracy: "The most formidable of all the ills that threaten the future 
of the Union arises from the presence of a black population upon its 
territory; and in contemplating the cause of the present embarrass- 
ments, or the future dangers of the United States, the observer is in- 
variably led to this as a primary fact" (356). 
2. Here, Tocqueville cited the displacement of the French by the 
Americans in Vincennes, Indiana, the dominance of the English in 
commerce and manufacturing in Canada and Louisiana and their con- 
finement of the French in Canada, and the settlement of Mexican-held 
Texas by the Americans (349). 
3. One often-cited instance is Thomas Jefferson's long-term affair 
with Sally Hemings, one of his daughter's slave attendants. Oral history 
and recent DNA evidence suggest that he may have fathered at least 
one, and possibly five, of her children. Thomas Sowell has claimed that 
as a result of chronic surpluses of white men over white women and 
black women over black men, an "estimated 1 to 2 percent of the ba- 
bies born to plantation slave women were fathered by white men, com- 
pared to nearly half in the cities" (1994, 207). He suggests this disparity 
resulted from an erosion of racial lines in urban settings. 
4. An analysis of the validated, as opposed to the reported, vote 
from the 1988 NES survey reveals that turnout is highest for mainline 
(old stock) respondents (73.9%), next highest for white ethnics 
(63.4%), lower for "Americans" (49.5%), and even lower for members 
of racial minorities. The rate drops to 46.7% among African Ameri- 
cans, 44.4% among Hispanics, and 41.2% among Asian Americans. 
References 
Banfield, Edward C. 1991. "The Illiberal Tocqueville." In Interpreting 
Tocqueville's Democracy in America, ed. Ken Masugi. Savage, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Beck, Roy. 1994. "The Ordeal of Immigration in Wausau." Atlantic 
Monthly 276(April): 84-97. 
Caplan, Robert. 1998. "Travels into America's Future." Atlantic 
Monthly 282(July): 47-68. 
Elazar, Daniel J. 1994. The American Mosaic. Boulder: Westview. 
Fallows, James. 1983. "The New Immigrants: How They Are Affecting 
Us." Atlantic Monthly 257(November): 45-103. 
Gillmor, Dan, and Stephen K. Doig. 1992. "Segregation Forever?" 
American Demographics 14(January): 48-51. 
James, Daniel. 1995. "Close the Borders to all Newcomers." In Taking 
Sides, ed. George McKenna and Stanley Feingold. Guilford, CT: 
Dushkin. 
Lieske, Joel. 1993. "Regional Subcultures of the United States." Jour- 
nal of Politics 55: 888-913. 
. 1998. "USA: Is There Room for the Third World?" In The New 
Third World, ed. Alfonso Gonzalez and Jim Norwine. Boulder: 
Westview. 
Murdock, Steve H. 1995. An America Challenged. Boulder: Westview. 
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. 1996. "Thomas Jefferson: Radical and Racist." 
Atlantic Monthly 278(0ctober): 53-74. 
Pierson, George Wilson. 1959. Tocqueville in America. Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday. 
Sandel, Michael J. 1996. Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of 
a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schleifer, James. 1980. The Making of Tocqueville's Democracy in 
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Sowell, Thomas. 1994. Race and Culture: A World View. New York: Ba- 
sic. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. [1835, 1840] 1945. Democracy in America. 2 vols. 
Trans. Henry Reeve. New York: Knopf. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1998. Statistical Abstract. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. 
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1991. The Politics of Ethnic Nepotism. New Delhi: 
Sterling. 
White, Theodore H. 1982. America in Search of Itself. New York: 
Harper and Row. 
Wilson, James Q., and John Dilulio. 1998. American Government. New 
York: D.C. Heath. 
PS June 1999 224 
